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THE LEGAL HISTORY OF THE STATE OF MISSOURI 
THE HONORABLE JOSEPH J. SIMEONE* 
INTRODUCTION 
Since the State of Missouri was formally admitted into the Union on 
August 10, 1821 by the proclamation of President James Monroe,1 Missouri 
has enjoyed a long and illustrious history.  The state continues to be rich in 
agriculture, wineries, mining, business, and industry.  It is the birthplace of 
many celebrities; was the site of the greatest world’s fair ever; hosts a number 
of prominent sports teams; and boasts a beautiful countryside that includes the 
cotton fields in the southeast, the farmlands in the northeast, and the beautiful 
mountains in the southwest.  Missouri has been the home of three Presidents of 
the United States: Harry S. Truman, Ulysses S. Grant, and David Rice 
Atchison.2  It is the home state of the first Governor, Governor McNair; Daniel 
Boone; Thomas Benton; Samuel Clemens; Joseph Pulitzer, Champ Clark; and 
two members of President Abraham Lincoln’s Cabinet.  The most popular 
novelist of the first part of the twentieth century, Winston Churchill,3 was also 
from Missouri. 
Missouri was also the first state to build a bridge across the Mississippi 
River.  The Eads Bridge, which at the time was called the Gateway to the 
 
* United States Administrative Law Judge.  B.S., J.D., LL.M., S.J.D. Professor Emeritus, Saint 
Louis University School of Law. The author is grateful to R. Stahlheber, Esq. for his editorial 
suggestions. 
 1. That proclamation even has a stormy history. 
 2. Atchison was President of the United States for one day. 
 3. Missouri’s Winston Churchill is not to be confused with the former Prime Minister of 
England. 
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West, opened the vast territory of the West to the country.  In fact, numerous 
journeys to the West began in Missouri with the expedition of Meriwether 
Lewis and William Clark. 
Since its admission to the Union, through the chaos and sadness of the 
Civil War to the present, Missouri, its citizens, and the law have changed 
dramatically.  At first, Missouri was a purely agrarian society.  After the Civil 
War, the population swelled, the cities grew, transportation and 
communications vastly improved, the railroads flourished, and new social 
changes took place.  The North-South cleavage was “bandaged,” and the 
people became one unified state.  The law, in Missouri’s early days, reflected 
the society of its time. 
The history of Missouri is replete with deeds of heroism, legal lore, and 
desperados, including the James brothers.  In 1883, Governor Thomas T. 
Crittenden reported in his annual message that since the close of the Civil War, 
Missouri had been infested by bands of train and bank robbers.  For example, 
in July 1881, Jesse James and his cohorts robbed a train on the line of the 
Chicago, Rock Island, and Pacific Railroad, and killed the conductor, William 
Westfall.  To combat these bandits, Governor Crittenden issued a proclamation 
for the arrest of Jesse James, and offered a $5000 reward.  Less than one year 
later, the governor proudly reported that Charles and Robert Ford, who were 
criminal associates of James, had killed him in St. Joseph, Missouri.4  In 
addition, Frank James had voluntarily surrendered himself.5 
II. THE ERAS OF MISSOURI LEGAL HISTORY 
Most people who know about the history of civilized law realize that any 
law can be an action, a reaction, and a reflection of the contemporary society, 
and the laws of Missouri are no exception.  Since its admission into the federal 
union in August, 1821, the legal history of Missouri has reflected the society of 
the particular time. This paper will analyze the four unique and distinct eras of 
Missouri’s legal history. 
During the first era of English common law, lasting from about 1821 until 
the Civil War, the law dealt with mundane matters and ordinary disputes 
among ordinary individuals.  For example, all the laws before the Civil War 
were contained in one small 200-page volume.  The law in this agrarian period 
dealt with private disputes over real property; recovery of personal property; a 
widow’s dower; property rights; adverse possession; and a few crimes of 
assault and burglary.  Meanwhile, none of the judicial opinions from this 
period would be fodder for today’s blaring evening news since many decisions 
dealt with the issue of slavery and slaves. 
 
 4. See Message of Governor Crittenden, Jan. 3, 1883. 
 5. Id. 
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The second era consisted of substantial economic development from after 
the Civil War lasting until the early part of the twentieth century.  This era 
reflected economic expansion, protectionism, and conservatism not only in 
Missouri, but also in the rest of the United States.  Based on their feeling of 
self-reliance, the citizens of Missouri did not want the government to have too 
much power; they distrusted the legislature and wanted to elect their own 
judges.  This second era was the age of both the iron-horse and the Industrial 
Revolution, reflected by the boom of the steel and mining industries.  Focused 
on economic expansion, the legislature did not address any major social issues. 
The third era began in the early decades of the twentieth century and ended 
roughly at the end of the 1950s.  With the dwindling of the economic era, the 
legislature began to refocus its attention to social issues, recognizing a need for 
reform while clinging to traditional values.  For the federal government, these 
social changes were reflected by the rise of administrative agencies.  The 
Missouri legislature, in some respects, mirrored the actions of the federal 
government.  The state’s judiciary, however, continued to adhere to the 
principles of the past in deciding tort, contract, and criminal law matters. 
The fourth era, from the 1960s to the 1990s, is self-entitled, “the legal 
revolution.”  In the past thirty years, the judiciary and the legislature have 
recognized new remedies for citizens, have overruled old precedents, and have 
significantly altered the face of justice in all aspects of civil and criminal law.  
The author believes Missouri’s legal history is now entering a fifth era that 
may be described as “the era of retrenchment, restriction, or conservatism.”  
Only time will determine the accuracy of this description. 
III. THE EARLY PERIOD 
A. The Legislature 
The first Missouri Constitution of 1820 seems to organize (1) the 
boundaries of the state,6 (2) the distribution of governmental powers,7 banks,8 
education,9 the militia,10 and (3) the declaration of citizen’s rights, 
encompassed in the Missouri Bill of Rights, modeled after the federal Bill of 
Rights.11  At that time, the General Assembly consisted of the Senate12 and the 
 
 6. See, e.g., MO. CONST. of 1820, art. X, § 2 (giving the state concurrent jurisdiction over 
all rivers forming common boundaries with other states, including the Mississsippi River); id. at 
art. III, § 34 (prohibiting counties of less than twenty square miles or more than four hundered 
square miles). 
 7. Id. at art. II, § 1. 
 8. Id. at art. VIII. 
 9. Id. at art. VI, §§ 1, 2. 
 10. Id. at art. IX, §§ 1-3. 
 11. MO. CONST. of 1820, art. VIII,  §§ 1-27. 
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House of Representatives13 and every legislator had to be at least twenty-four 
years of age, free, white, and male.14  This legislative body was empowered to 
create laws dealing with issues such as slavery and education.15  For example, 
while the legislature did not have the power to emancipate slaves without their 
owner’s consent, it did have the power to authorize the owners of slaves to 
emancipate them.16  Also, the legislature authorized and established a state 
university, reflecting its desire to encourage higher education.17 
The early laws passed by the General Assembly were fascinating.  All of 
the laws of Missouri, until almost the end of the Nineteenth Century, were 
contained in one small volume.  The laws of 1825 provided that any free man 
who committed the crime of rape would be castrated by some skillful surgeon; 
however, a slave who committed rape would be castrated by some person, not 
necessarily as skillful.18  Ten years later, the laws dealt with joint tenants, 
administration of decedent’s estates, boats and steam vessels, jurisdiction of 
county courts, and most importantly, crimes and punishments.19  A particular 
statute in the laws of 1855 states, “if any person shall play at any game with 
cards, or dice, or any gambling device on board any steamboat at which 
money may be bet, such person shall be fined $100.”20 
B. The Supreme Court 
Meanwhile, the Supreme Court consisted of three judges who held sessions 
throughout the state.21  The governor had the sole power to appoint all judges, 
and a two-third vote by both houses of the General Assembly could summarily 
remove the judges.22 
The Missouri Supreme Court’s first judicial decisions after the state’s 
admission into the Union mostly addressed mundane matters involving the 
common law remedies of “assumpsit” and “detinue.”23  In addition, many of 
 
 12. The Senate consisted of at least fourteen and no more than thirty-three Senators. See MO. 
CONST. of 1820, art. III, § 6. 
 13. The House of Representatives consisted of no more than 100 members. See MO. CONST. 
of 1820, art. III, § 2. 
 14. See MO. CONST. of 1820, art. III, §§ 3, 5. 
 15. Id. at art. III, §§ 26-28. 
 16. Id. § 26. 
 17. Id. at art. VI, § 2. 
 18. MO. REV. STAT. §§ 9, 99 (1825).  See also Orville Richardson, Sexual Offenses Under 
The Proposed Criminal Code, 38 MO. LAW REV. 371, 394 (1973). 
 19. See generally MO. REV. STAT. §§ 1-15 (1835). 
 20. Our forefathers would certainly be surprised to learn riverboat casino gambling is legal 
today. 
 21. See generally MO. CONST. of 1820, art. V. 
 22. See MO. CONST. of 1820, art. V, §§ 13, 16. 
 23. Generally, the Supreme Court did not have a great deal of authority to support its early 
opinions. 
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these early cases dealt with the recovery of slaves.  For example, in 1857, the 
Court held that a coerced confession from a slave could not be used against the 
slave at his murder trial.24  Strangely enough, even before Dred Scott,25 the 
Court held that a slave who was moved to a state where slavery did not exist 
would be entitled to his freedom.26  Other cases reflect the sentiments of the 
time.  For example, the Court supported a guilty verdict for a man who 
furnished a deck of cards to a group of gamblers because he violated 
Missouri’s gambling statute. In another case, the Court held it to be a crime, 
punishable by imprisonment, for a married man to live out of wedlock with 
another woman who was not his wife.27  Later, the Court also held that a child 
under the age of eighteen was exempt from being imprisoned in the 
penitentiary, but was not exempt from the death penalty.28  Other cases seem 
somewhat peculiar by today’s standards.  For example, in Nathan v. State, the 
defendant was convicted of rape and was sentenced to the punishment of 
castration.29  In another case, a cripple charged with murder was not permitted 
to introduce evidence that, due to his weak and crippled condition, he was 
rendered nervous and peculiarly sensitive.30 
Other early Missouri Supreme Court cases dealt with: (1) a widow’s 
dower,31 (2) affidavits made by agents,32 (3) defenses used for the recovery of 
a slaves,33 (4) the criminal procedure relating to crimes of assault and battery,34 
 
 24. See Williamson, The State v. Mat, JOURNAL OF MO. BAR, Jan. 1954, at 19. 
 25. See generally Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857). 
 26. LaGrange v. Chouteau, 2 Mo. 20 (1828). 
 27. State v. Byron, 20 Mo. 210 (1854). 
 28. State v. Adams, 76 Mo. 355 (1882) 
 29. 8 Mo. 631, 631-32 (1844). 
 30. State v. Shoultz, 25 Mo. 128 (1850). 
 31. Collier v. Wheldon, 1 Mo. 1 (1821) (holding that where a widow rents property that she 
has a dower interest, the widow cannot have her dower assigned against the tenant but must 
instead sue for rent). 
 32. Cook v. Globe Printing Co., 127 S.W. 332 (Mo. 1910) (charging chairman of a political 
state committee with making a false affidavit as to campaign contributions to expenses). 
 33. See generally Knapp v. Knapp, 96 S.W. 295, 300 (Mo. App. 1906). 
 34. Stots v. Johnson, 4 Mo. 618 (Mo. 1837) (holding that a faulty battery is an offense that 
may be tried summarily in a bench trial). 
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and (5) actions of “debt,”35 and actions36 between partners, ejectment,37 
estates,38 the right to trial by jury,39 and procedure.40 
1. The Death Penalty 
For quite a few years in the Nineteenth Century there were very few death 
sentences and executions. Even as late as the 1930s there were few executions 
in Missouri.41  The lack of the imposition of the death penalty in the early 
history of Missouri, as well as other states, may have been the result of the two 
hundred offenses that carried the death penalty in Eighteenth Century England.  
According to the Missouri Department of Corrections, however, the first 
execution by public hanging took place at the Spanish Military Barracks in 
New Madrid on January 1, 1803. 
The first Missouri Supreme Court case that imposed the death penalty was 
in 1839 in Fanny v. State.42  Fanny, a female slave of William Prewitt, was 
charged with the murder of William Florence, a nine or ten year old boy, who 
was found dead in Prewitt’s peach orchard.43  The evidence showed that Fanny 
had killed the boy.44  The defense counsel argued that capital punishment could 
not be inflicted upon a slave, and that the proper punishment should be a 
whipping.45  The Court held, however, that the death penalty applied equally to 
both slaves and free men.46 
 
 35. Edwards v. McKee, 1 Mo. 123 (Mo. 1821) (finding that an agreement that the price of 
goods delivered does not preclude an action in debt for the money after the time for payment has 
elapsed). 
 36. Paul v. Edwards, 1 Mo. 30 (Mo. 1821) (holding that  a covenant between partners to 
divide goods on hand at taking place at certain event, implies a covenant to make final settlement 
when such division is made). 
 37. Laughlin v. Stone, 5 Mo. 43 (1837) (holding that a person cannot set up an outstanding 
title in a third person if that person sells land to parties that were in an ejectment action). 
 38. Chouteau v. Consoue, 1 Mo. 350 (1823). 
 39. State v. Ledford, 3 Mo. 102 (Mo. 1832) (holding that summary trials for an assault do 
not violate a plaintiff’s state constitutional right to a trial by jury). 
 40. Laporte v. State, 6 Mo. 208 (Mo. 1839) (holding that a writ of error will not lie at the 
decision of a circuit court in delaying a motion to discharge a defendant from recognizance). 
 41. See WILLIAM J. BOWERS, EXECUTIONS IN AMERICA 285-86 (1974).  From 1938 until 
1970 there were a total of thirty-nine executions in Missouri.  It was not until the 1900s that the 
Court granted more executions. Between the 1920s and 1940s, the number of executions in the 
United States exceeded one thousand. See BOWERS, supra at 5-7. 
 42. 6 Mo. 122 (1839).  This case was ultimately reversed and remanded for a new trial based 
on other errors. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 141-42. 
 46. Id. at 142.  For a good modern discussion of the death penalty in Missouri, see Ellen 
Yankiver Suni, Capital Punishment in Missouri: Recent Developments in the Interpretation and 
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Until 1937, the method of execution was public hanging.47  In 1886, for 
example, some 25,000 people watched while a man was publicly hanged in 
Gallatin, Missouri.  Reportedly, the crowd gathered early and many regarded 
the event as a holiday.48  On May 21, 1937, the last person to be publicly 
hanged in Missouri, Roscoe “Red” Turner, was executed in Galena in front of 
at least 400 witnesses.  The newspapers showed close-up pictures of the 
accused, with the hood being placed over his head, and his suspended body 
after it had fallen through the trap.49 
After 1937, executions were administered by lethal gas.50  In March 1938, 
William Wright and John Brown were the first persons in Missouri to be 
executed by lethal gas.51  In 1965, Lloyd Leo Anderson was the last person to 
be executed before the Missouri Supreme Court outlawed the death penalty.52  
The Missouri laws provided, and still do, that executions must take place 
“within the walls of a correctional facility.”53  Since the death penalty was 
recently re-instituted, George (Tiny) Mercer was executed on January 6,  
1989.54 
Despite this history of capital punishment, at the beginning of the 
Nineteenth Century, there was a movement toward abolishing the death 
penalty.55  The assault on the imposition of the death penalty began in 1764 
with Cesare Beccaria’s treatise, On Crimes and Punishments,56 asserting, as we 
still do today, that deterrence is useless.57  Evidence of this momentum 
consisted of the numerous petitions filed that called for the abolition of the 
death penalty.  The Supreme Court of Missouri’s decisions to reverse every 
death penalty case - on very technical grounds - reflects the effects of this 
movement.  For example, the Missouri Supreme Court reversed a death 
 
Administration of the Death Penalty, 58 UMKC L. REV. 523 (1990); Richard H. Burr, III, 
Representing the Client on Death Row: The Politics of Advocacy, 59 UMKC L. REV. 1 (1990). 
 47. See James J. Fisher, Hanging Was a Spectator Sport in 1937 Galena, KANSAS CITY 
STAR, April 17, 1991, at G1 (stating that according to Dr. Harriet Frazier, Associate Professor of 
Criminal Justice at Central Missouri State University in Warrensburg the last person publicly 
hanged in the United States was killer-rapist Rainey Betho, age 32, in Owensboro, Kentucky). 
 48. See ST. JOSEPH NEWS PRESS, Oct. 7, 1938. 
 49. See id. 
 50. Associated Press, A Look at Capital Punishment in Missouri by the Numbers, Digital 
Missourian (visited Oct. 6, 1999) <http://digmo.org/feature/premium/19numbers.html>. 
 51. BOWERS, supra note 41, at 285. 
 52. Id. at 286. 
 53. MO. REV. STAT. § 546.720 (1994). 
 54. Jerry Hughes, Execution Evokes a Primal Hate, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, at 3A (Sept. 
11, 1990). 
 55. BOWERS, supra note 41, at 4-6. 
 56. CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS 45-52 (1764). 
 57. Beccaria proclaimed the supreme value of human life, arguing nothing in the social 
contract gives the state the right to take human life. See generally id. 
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sentence because an indictment for murder required the words “against the 
peace and dignity of the state.”58  Instead, the indictment in the case stated only 
“against the peace and dignity of state,” omitting the word “the.”59 
The death penalty was abolished in Missouri in 1917, but after a series of 
police killings, the death penalty was restored in 1919. As of June 1990, 
eighty-two inmates were on Missouri’s death row; seven inmates have been 
executed in 1999.60 
IV. THE POST CIVIL WAR ERA TO THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 
A. A New Constitution 
Even though the Civil War was a great constitutional crisis, with the Dred 
Scott61 decision acting as a catalyst for that holocaust, the United States 
Constitution survived, and almost every state, including Missouri, adopted new 
state constitutions. In 1875, Missouri adopted a “new” state constitution, 
making the law much more complex and detailed.62  Conventions were held to 
deal with the major problems of the time: railroads, banks, agriculture and 
suffrage. 
The 1875 Missouri Constitution addressed numerous issues. For example, 
it outlined the rights of persons; the distribution of powers; the limitations of 
legislative power; the judicial department, revenue, taxation, corporations, 
railroads, banks, the militia, initiative and referendum; and the specific 
jurisdiction of a number of special courts.63  Until an amendment in 1924, only 
male citizens were permitted to vote.64  Also, no insane person, idiot, or person 
kept in a “poor-house” was permitted to vote.65  This constitution gave the 
legislature the power to tax corporations, railroads, banks, and other entities 
and persons; cemeteries were tax exempt, however.  The Constitution further 
provided that “separate free public schools shall be established for the 
 
 58. See State v. Adkins, 225 S.W. 981 (Mo. 1920). 
 59. See id.; Laurence M. Hyde, A Missouri Centennial Which has Been Overlooked—Some 
Comments on Criminal Procedure and Law Enforcement, 6 MO. B. J. 102 (1935) (discussing 
other cases where convictions were reversed on technicalities). 
 60. Those inmates executed in 1999 were Kevin Malone on January 13; James Rodden on 
February 24; Roy Roberts on March 10; Ray Ramsey, Jr. on April 14; Ralph Davis on April 28; 
Jessie Wise on May 26; Bruce Kilgore on June 16; and Robert Walls on June 30. See Missouri’s 
Death Penalty This Year, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, June 20, 1999, at A11. 
 61. See generally Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857). 
 62. The Constitution’s Preamble states, “We, the people of Missouri, with profound 
reverence for the Supreme Ruler of the Universe, and grateful for His goodness, do, for the better 
government of the State establish this Constitution.” See MO. CONST. of 1875 preamble. 
 63. See generally MO. CONST. of 1875. 
 64. MO. CONST. of 1875, art. VIII, § 2 (1924). 
 65. Id. 
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education of children of African descent.”66  The Supreme Court upheld the 
constitutionality of this provision in Lehew v. Brummel.67  The Court in Lehew 
held that separate schools for blacks did not violate the United States 
Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment.68 
The 1875 constitution also had specific articles dealing with the formation 
of corporations, railroads and street railways.69  The latter two were to be 
public highways subject to the power of the legislature.70  It is interesting to 
note this constitution also prohibited lotteries.71 
B. The Legislature and the Supreme Court 
The judicial decisions rendered by the courts continued to reflect the 
changing times.  While some cases dealt with common subjects such as real 
property, adverse possession, and mortgages, the law expanded in areas such 
as business and corporate regulation, family law, commerce, crime and 
punishment, and private tort remedies.  Meanwhile, the legislature recognized 
women’s rights, passing statutes that recognized a woman as a legal person and 
allowing a woman to protect her separate property and her dower rights.72 
The early judicial decisions dealt with private disputes involving contracts,  
bailments, property, boats and vessels, evidence, boundary disputes, and 
criminal law, and gambling.73  There were also actions filed against 
municipalities for failure to repair defects in the streets,74 in addition to 
criminal cases involving points of evidence.  Almost every leading case during 
the last half of the Nineteenth Century dealt with railroads and negligence, 
where the Court often decided in favor of the booming industrial corporations.  
Tort law, specifically remedies, was on the rise due to the Industrial 
Revolution, whose awesome machines had a great capacity for injuring or 
smashing the human body.  The cases dealt with contributory negligence, 
assumption of risk, and all the other tort concepts, which precluded recovery. 
During the period following the Civil War and into the early years of the 
twentieth century, the judicial decisions continued to protect business and 
property rights.  The judiciary placed less emphasis on personal and individual 
 
 66. MO. CONST. of 1875, art. VIII, § 3 (1932). 
 67. 15 S.W. 765 (Mo. 1891). 
 68. Id. 
 69. MO. CONST. of 1875, art. XII, §§ 1-24 (1875). 
 70. MO. CONST. art. XII, §§ 14 (1875). 
 71. MO. CONST. art. XIV, § 10 (1875). 
 72. See generally Rogers v. Rogers, 177 S.W. 382 (Mo. 1915) citing MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 
1735, 8304 (West 1909). 
 73. Thompson v. Bunton, 22 S.W. 863 (Mo. 1893) (holding that a person who keeps watch 
at a place of gambling is guilty of an offense); Tyree v. Gingham, 13 S.W. 952 (Mo. 1890) 
(addressing the duty of the state of care for Confederate soldiers). 
 74. Squires v. City of Chillicothe, 1 S.W. 23 (Mo. 1886). 
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rights.  For example, the courts protected businesses in general, and railroads 
in particular.  This business protectionism seemed to be the trend throughout 
the country.  In Ryan v. New York Central Railroad Co., 75 a railroad 
company’s carelessness caused the plaintiff’s house to burn down.76  Even 
though there was no question that the railroad company was at fault, the court 
denied the plaintiff’s claim for damages.77  The court reasoned, “[t]o sustain 
such a claim as the present . . . would subject [the railroad] to a liability against 
which no prudence could guard.”78  The court added “in a country where men 
are crowded,” it is impossible to “guard against the occurrence of accidental or 
negligent fires.”79  Therefore, in a commercial country it seems as though each 
man runs the hazard of his neighbor’s conduct. 
Many decisions dealt with railroads and the application of the laws 
regarding negligence.  The law of contributory negligence, which would 
preclude recovery if a plaintiff was negligent, was not fit for the era of the 
“iron-horse.”  Therefore, the Supreme Court of Missouri developed a doctrine 
that softened the law of contributory negligence.  The Court adopted the 
“humanitarian doctrine,” which was unique to the State of Missouri.80  The 
humanitarian doctrine was based on the principle that a defendant will be liable 
for damages to an injured person or widow of that person if the defendant, 
operating a dangerous machine, had the “last clear chance” to avoid injuring a 
human being even if that party was oblivious to the danger.81  The doctrine was 
later adopted and modified to serve the era of the street-car and the “new 
fangled” automobile, until the 1980s, when it was replaced with the principles 
of “comparative fault.”82 
Even though the Court seemed to favor big business, there are cases where 
David did defeat Goliath.  For example, in Glaessner v. Anheuser-Busch 
Brewing Ass’n.,83 Anheuser-Busch desired to build and maintain a railroad 
track across Broadway to the river.84  The Mayor and the Board of Aldermen 
authorized the brewery to build a private railroad across Broadway, but the 
plaintiff, Mr. Glaessner, sought to stop the building of the tracks across 
Broadway because the railroad tracks would decrease the value of his property 
 
 75. 1866 WL 5620 (N.Y.) (1866). 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id.  
 79. Id. 
 80. See William H. Becker, Jr., The Missouri Supreme Court and the Humanitarian 
Doctrine in the Year 1953, 19 MO. L. REV. 48, 49 (1954).  See also, William H. Becker, Jr., The 
Humanitarian Doctrine, 3 MO. L. REV. 392 (1938). 
 81. Becker, The Humanitarian Doctrine, 3 MO. L. REV. 392; see also Banks v. Morris, 257 
S.W. 482, 484 (Mo. banc 1924). 
 82. See infra Part VI. 
 83. 13 S.W. 707 (Mo. 1890). 
 84. Id. 
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and hurt his small business.85  The Supreme Court held that the brewery and 
the City could not create such a “nuisance” by building a private railroad, 
stating the “the king cannot license the erection or commission of a 
nuisance.”86 
The numerous judicial decisions protecting business seemed to be so 
one-sided, however, that ordinary citizens began to complain in newspapers.  
One prominent case involved a suit against J. M. Shepherd, the publisher of a 
newspaper in Warrensburg, Missouri.87  The case had its inception in a 
personal injury suit brought by Rube Oglesby against the Missouri Pacific 
Railroad.88  The Supreme Court held Mr. Shepherd in criminal and civil 
 
 85. Id. at 708. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Crow v. Shepherd, 76 S.W. 79 (Mo. 1903). 
 88. See id. at 80: 
And now, as the capsheaf of all this corruption in high places, the Supreme Court has, at 
the whipcrack of the Missouri Pacific Railroad, sold its soul to the corporations, and 
allowed Rube Oglesby to drag his wrecked frame through this life without even the pitiful 
remuneration of a few paltry dollars.  Learned men of the law say that Rube Oglesby had 
the best damage suit against a corporation ever taken to the Supreme Court.  This very 
tribunal, after reading the evidence and hearing the arguments of the attorneys, rendered a 
decision sustaining the judgment of the lower court, which decision was concurred in by 
six of the seven members of the court.  This is usually the end of such cases, and the 
decision of a Supreme Court, once made, usually stands.  But not so in the Oglesby case.  
Three times was this case, at the request of the railway attorneys, opened for rehearing, 
and three times was the judgment of the lower court sustained.  But during this time, 
which extended over a period of several years, the legal department of this great 
corporation was not the only department which was busy in circumventing the defeat of 
the Oglesby case. The political department was very, very busy.  Each election has seen 
the hoisting of a railway attorney to the Supreme Bench, and, when that body was to the 
satisfaction of the Missouri Pacific, the onslaught to kill the Oglesby case began.  A 
motion for a rehearing was granted, and at the hearing of the case it was reversed on an 
error in record of the trial court, and was sent back for retrial.  That was in the early part 
of the year 1902.  The case was tried in Sedalia before Circuit Judge Longan, one of the 
ablest jurists in the state, and we have been informed that no error was allowed to creep 
into the record at the second trial.  Again the jury rendered judgment in favor of Oglesby 
for $15,000, and again the case was appealed to the Supreme Court.  An election was 
coming on, and the railroad needed yet another man to beat the Oglesby case.  The 
Democratic nominating convention was kind, and furnished him, in the person of Fox.  
The railroad, backed by four judges on the bench, allowed the case to come up for final 
hearing, and Monday the decision was handed down, reversed outright and not remanded 
for retrial. The victory of the railroad has been complete, and the corruption of the 
Supreme Court has been thorough.  It has reversed and stultified itself in this case until no 
sane man can have any other opinion but that the judges who concurred in the opinion 
dismissing the Oglesby case have been bought in the interest in the railroad. What hope 
have the ordinary citizens of Missouri for justice and equitable laws in bodies where such 
open venality is practiced?  And how long will they stand it?  The corporations have long 
owned the Legislature, now they own the Supreme Court, and the citizen who applies to 
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contempt.89  It held that (1) courts have the inherent power to hold a person in 
contempt, (2) the liberty of the press does not extend to speech which is 
blasphemous, immoral, seditious or defamatory,90 (3) there is no right to a jury 
trial in a contempt case, and (4) there is no right to scandalize the courts - for 
“[h]e . . . who seeks to destroy the authority of the courts invites anarchy and 
sows the seeds for his own undoing.  It is the liberty of the press that is 
guarantied [sic], not the licentiousness.”91 
C. Social Changes 
This was also the era of ultra-conservatism - when the predominate 
political philosophy was that private individuals should not be aided by, or 
interfered with, by the government.  This era abhorred social legislation and 
any concept of socialism. One Supreme Court decision that is particularly 
significant is Garth v. Switzer.92  The case involved a law adopted in 1895, 
which imposed a tax to be used for free scholarships for students attending the 
University of Missouri.93  In order to defray expenses, the Act’s stated purpose 
was to further education.94  The Supreme Court struck down the law as 
unconstitutional, stating that public funds used for individual students violated 
the United States Constitution.95  Lawyers for the University argued (1) that 
education is a public purpose for which taxes may be levied and (2) that such 
scholarships do not amount to “paternalism . . . of a hurtful or dangerous 
kind.”96  The Supreme Court rejected these arguments,97 however, and its 
 
either for justice against the corporation gets nothing.  Rube Oglesby and his attorney, Mr. 
O.L. Houts, have made a strong fight for justice.  They have not got it. The quivering limb 
that Ruby left beneath the rotten freight car on Independence Hill, and his blood that 
stained the right of way of the soulless corporation, have been buried beneath the wise 
legal verbiage of a venal court, and the wheels of the Juggernaut will continue to grind 
out men’s lives, and a crooked court will continue to refuse them and their relatives 
damages, until the time comes when Missourians, irrespective of politics, rise up in their 
might and slay at the ballot box the corporation-bought lawmakers of the state. 
Id. (emphasis added) (quoting the original text). 
 89. See id. at 81-84. 
 90. The opinions had lengthy discussions of the constitutional guaranty and the history of 
free speech in America. 
 91. Id. at 95. 
 92. State ex rel. Garth v. Switzer, 45 S.W. 245 (Mo. 1898). 
 93. Id. at 246. 
 94. Id. at 246-48. 
 95. Id. at 248. 
 96. Id. at 251. 
 97. See Garth, 45 S.W. at 251. 
Paternalism, whether state or federal, as the derivation of the term implies, is an 
assumption by the government of a quasi fatherly relation to the citizen and his family, 
involving excessive governmental regulation of the private affairs and business methods 
and interests of the people, upon the theory that the people are incapable of managing 
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decision remained the law until it was overruled in 1976 in Americans United 
v. Rogers.98 
V. THE SOCIAL LEGISLATION ERA – 1920S - 1950S 
It was not until the first part of the twentieth century that the legal history 
of Missouri focused again on the protection of individuals. This change was 
reflected in various areas of law, despite the fact that contributory negligence 
was still a complete defense to a negligence action, and assumption of risk 
continued to preclude recoveries. 
The movement towards workers’ compensation benefits gradually began to 
appear on the legal scene, and culminated in the Workmen’s (now Workers’) 
Compensation Act, which was passed in 1925.99  As evidence of the peoples’ 
 
their own affairs, and is pernicious in its tendencies.  In a word, it minimizes the citizen, 
and maximizes the government.  Our federal and state governments are founded upon a 
principle wholly antagonistic to such a doctrine.  Our fathers believed the people of these 
free and independent states were capable of self-government, a system in which the 
people are the sovereigns, and the government their creature, to carry out their commands.  
Such a government is founded on the willingness and the right of the people to take care 
of their own affairs, and an indisposition on their part to look to the government for 
everything.  The citizen is the unit.  It is his province to support the government, and not 
the government to support him.  Under self-government, we have advanced in all the 
elements of a great people more rapidly than any nation that has ever existed upon the 
earth, and there is greater need now than ever before in our history of adhering to it.  
Paternalism is a plant that should receive no nourishment upon the soil of Missouri.  
While the exigencies of this case may require the operation of such a principle, we are 
sure its germ is not to be found in the constitution of this state, nor in the spirit of its 
people.  Whatever other fault the constitution of 1875 may have, it is certain that its 
framers sought most sedulously to curb the power of those clothed with authority to 
legislate in behalf of favored classes, and to leave the people the largest possible control 
over their own affairs.  Especially has the power of taxation been jealously hedged about 
and limited . . . . It is one thing to provide for the establishment and maintenance of a state 
university and a system of free public schools,—the state, through its own officers, 
agencies, and municipalities, constructing and owning the buildings and apparatus, and 
employing the teachers as public functionaries, responsible under her own laws for the 
discharge of their duties,—and a wholly different thing to support private individuals who 
attend the university and public schools, by public taxation.  But it is said that nothing is 
more common than the endowment of free scholarships as a part of the endowment of a 
university. This may be true of the universities of Europe, and individual instances are to 
be found in this country where some great benefactor of the race has, out of his own 
bounty, provided such scholarships; but these examples furnish no guide to the free states 
of this Union, clearly not to the legislature of Missouri under its organic law. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 98. 538 S.W.2d 711, 718-19 (1976) (holding that a student financial assistance program is 
constitutional).  See MO. REV. STAT. §§ 173.200-230 (1994). 
 99. Laws 1925, pp. 375-407 C.S.H.B. 112, 53rd Leg., 1925 Mo. Laws 375; 1927 Mo. Laws 
490 (referred to a vote of the people on Nov. 2, 1926, approved by a vote of 561,898 against 
251,822). 
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social change and awareness, the Act was officially adopted in the election on 
November 2, 1926 - but not without a struggle, since the legislature had been 
debating this issue as early as 1909.100  When it finally was adopted, the law 
was “founded on the principle of insurance and is not to be deemed a pension, 
a bounty or a gratuity. . . .The theory [dealt with] the loss of earning capacity 
resulting from injuries received in the course of and as a result of 
employment.”101  Therefore, the industry could absorb the cost of industrial 
accidents and justify them as costs of production.102  This law was the first 
piece of social legislation enacted in the history of Missouri.103 
After the enactment of this law, the first case the Court considered was 
Elsas v. Missouri Workmen’s Compensation Commission.104  It was a writ of 
mandamus to compel the Workmen’s Compensation Commission to assume 
jurisdiction of a worker’s claim.105  The Court held that the law became 
effective on the day it was voted on, November 2, 1926, so that a workman 
who was injured on November 4, 1926 could make a claim for 
compensation.106 
While there were several laws passed relating to social legislation at the 
state level during the period 1920s through the 1950s, the Supreme Court did 
not stray from the traditional, common-law path when it answered questions 
such as: (1) could the State of Missouri be subjected to a suit for personal 
injuries? (2) was a charity immune from suit? (3) could a consumer recover 
against a manufacturer of goods, when the product was purchased through a 
retailer? (4) could one spouse sue another for negligence? (5) could an injured 
person recover for emotional distress? (6) should the law of strict contributory 
negligence be abolished? and (7) could a wife (not the husband) recover 
damages for the loss of love and affection? 
Until 1969,107 charitable institutions were absolutely immune from a 
lawsuit seeking to recover damages for personal injury, due to the doctrine of 
charitable immunity, which was adopted in Missouri in 1907.108  In adopting 
this policy, the Court reasoned that it is in the best interest of every member of 
the public that charitable institutions, designed for the alleviation of human 
suffering or for the moral well-being of mankind, be built and maintained by 
 
 100. R. Robert Cohn, (History of Workmen’s Compensation Law), 15 V.A.M.S. at 17, 19 
(1965).  
 101. Id. at 25. 
 102. Id. 
 103. See generally id. at 24-25. 
 104. 2 S.W.2d 796 (Mo. 1928). 
 105. Id. 
 106. Elsas, 2 S.W.2d at 798-99, 801. 
 107. See Abernathy v. Sisters of St. Mary’s, 446 S.W.2d 599 (Mo. banc 1969). 
 108. See Adams v. University Hosp., 99 S.W. 453 (1907). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1999] THE LEGAL HISTORY OF THE STATE OF MISSOURI 1409 
the friends of the benevolent institutions.109  Further, these institutions should 
be protected from any action that might tend to close any donors’ purses or 
deplete the institution’s funds.110  The Court, in effect, said that it is better for a 
particular individual to suffer, than to risk the probability that the public be 
deprived of the benefits provided by the institution. 
Similarly, the Missouri appellate courts clung to the doctrine that the State 
of Missouri, viewed as the sovereign, was immune from tort liability.  For 
years, the courts held that there were many legal and policy justifications for 
the doctrine; therefore, the state could not be sued for personal injury.  The 
prevailing court viewpoint was that it is better for the individual to suffer a 
particular loss than for the people to suffer financial instability, which would 
disrupt the normal functions of government.111  Also, the Court reasoned that it 
was not the function of the courts to legislate public policy; instead, that task 
should be the function of the legislature.112 
The court addressed spousal immunity issues with striking similarity.113  
According to interpretations, a wife could not sue her husband, and the 
husband could not sue his wife.114  To permit one spouse to sue the other 
would, according to the Court, greatly disrupt the foundation of society - the 
family.  It was not until 1986 that this doctrine changed.115 
Another area of law that was slow to change was the law of products 
liability.  For the manufacture of defective products, the doctrine of “strict 
liability” was not recognized in Missouri because the consumer was not in 
“privity” with the manufacturer.116  This was not changed in Missouri until the 
late Sixties.117 
Similarly, an individual could not recover damages for purely an emotional 
injury. Instead, there had to be a physical touching before recovery was 
allowed.118  The underlying principle was based upon (1) the difficulty of proof 
 
 109. See generally MO. REV. STAT. § 537.600 (1999). 
 110. Id. at 453-54. 
 111. O’Dell v. School Dist. of Independence, 521 S.W.2d 403, 407-08 (Mo. banc 1975). 
 112. Id. 
 113. Rogers v. Rogers, 177 S.W. 382 (Mo. 1915). 
 114. Id. at 384. 
 115. See Townsend v. Townsend, 708 S.W.2d 647, 649 (Mo. banc 1986) (holding that 
common law doctrine of interspousal immunity is not a bar to claims for personal injuries 
inflicted by one spouse against the other during marriage); S.A.V. v. K.G.V., 708 S.W.2d 651, 
652 (Mo. banc 1986) (holding that the doctrine of spousal immunity is no longer available to bar 
claims for negligence by one spouse against the other during marriage). 
 116. See Keener v. Dayton Elec. Mfg. Co., 445 S.W.2d 362, 364 (Mo. banc 1969) (construing 
Morrow v. Caloric Appliance Corp., 372 S.W.2d 41 (1963)). 
 117. Id. 
 118. Trigg v. The St. Louis Kansas City & Northern Ry. Co., 74 Mo. 147 (1891). 
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and (2) the possibility that recovery would give rise to and encourage 
imaginary and fraudulent claims.119 
These are only a few examples of the conservative traditional principles 
that existed until the late 1950s.  It was an era that adhered to precedent and an 
era of conservatism.  According to the prevailing thought, it was better for an 
individual to bear a loss rather than require that all of the members of society 
pay. 
VI. THE ERA OF LEGAL REVOLUTION – 1960S - PRESENT 
In the 1960s, a legal revolution took place in both civil and criminal 
jurisprudence.  The decisions relating to criminal justice are generally 
well-known today.  For example, changes took place in the law of search and 
seizure, regarding both the right of an indigent to have a free lawyer and 
motions to vacate sentences.  Moreover, statutory changes were also made in 
the field of substantive criminal law, in divorce cases, “fault” was no longer an 
element in the burden of proof.  The revolution in the civil law area is also 
vast, and the revolution is so extensive that only a selection of the highlights 
can be reviewed. 
This quiet revolution, beginning in the late 1960s, was expressed in 
numerous, precedent-breaking decisions of the Supreme Court as well as in the 
enactments of the General Assembly.  The laws dealt with a host of 
environmental and consumer protection issues, while other laws changed the 
rules relating to the infirm and the mentally ill.  These significant changes 
pervaded every field of law: negligence,120 products liability, the judicial 
system, worker’s compensation,121 sovereign immunity,122 health care, 
 
 119. Bass v. Nooney, 646 S.W.2d 765 (Mo. banc 1983): 
Instead of the old impact rule, a plaintiff will be permitted to recover for emotional 
distress provided (1) the defendant should have realized that his conduct involved an 
unreasonable risk of causing the distress, and (2) the emotional distress or mental injury 
must be medically diagnosable and must be of sufficient severity so as to be moderately 
significant. 
Id. at 772-73. 
 120. See generally Townsend, 708 S.W.2d at 649; S.A.V., 708 S.W.2d at 652 (abolishing the 
doctrine of “interspousal immunity,” overruling all the past precendent and making it possible for 
one spouse to sue the other for negligence and tort). 
 121. See generally Wolfgeher v. Wagner Cartage Service, 646 S.W.2d 781, 785 (Mo. banc 
1983).  The law of Worker’s Compensation was made more liberal and the definition of an “on 
the job accident” was changed.  The court said that the time has come to join the majority of the 
states in liberally construing the term “accident.” 
 122. As to the old law relating to sovereign immunity, the Court, too, changed this in 1977.  
The General Assembly disagreed with this decision, however, and quickly reinstated the doctrine, 
with certain limitations.  See Jones v. State Highway Comm’n., 557 S.W.2d 225, 230 (Mo. banc 
1977); see MO. REV. STAT. § 537.600 (1994). 
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emotional distress,123 and the right to die.124  There were great changes in the 
law of evidence and procedure, as well as in the law relating to privileged 
communications.125  Anyone who glances at the statutes and judicial decisions 
can only conclude that the face of justice dramatically changed in Missouri 
during this era. 
One of the great changes in the law of negligence took place in the case of 
Gustafson v. Benda where the Court abolished the law of contributory 
negligence as well as the humanitarian doctrine and adopted the principle of 
“comparative fault.”126  The Gustafson decision substituted the principle that a 
jury may assign a percentage of fault individually to the plaintiff and to the 
defendant,127 whereby the plaintiff’s recovery is then reduced by his 
percentage of fault.128  This was a novel concept in the law, causing Judge 
Gunn to comment that Gustafson is an example of “intru[sion] into an area 
belong[ing] to the legislature,” and of “judicial fiat.”129 
As to the law of products liability, the old precedents were overruled, and 
the consumer was allowed to maintain a claim against manufacturers of 
products used in daily life.130  The Keener decision abolished the privity 
doctrine and held that, henceforth, a person who sells a product in a defective 
condition that is reasonably dangerous to the consumer is subject to liability if 
two conditions are met: (1) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such 
a product, and (2) the product reaches the consumer without substantial change 
in the condition in which it was sold.131  This principle of strict liability may 
apply even if the seller has exercised all possible care in the manufacture and 
sale of the product and even if the consumer has not entered into any 
contractual relation with the manufacturer.132  The policy underlying this new 
tort, strict liability, is that it ensures that the manufacture will bear the costs of 
injuries resulting from defective products, rather than forcing the injured 
 
 123. See Bass, 646 S.W.2d at 769; see also Virginia D. v. Madesco, 648 S.W.2d 881 (Mo. 
banc 1984). 
 124. See generally Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) aff’g 
Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988). 
 125. See Rowe v. Farmers Ins. Co. Inc., 699 S.W.2d 423 (Mo. banc 1985) (evidence); 
Chandra v. Sprinkle, 678 S.W.2d 804 (Mo. banc 1984) (physicians); Friedman v. Provoznik, 668 
S.W.2d 76 (Mo. banc 1984). 
 126. Gustafson v. Benda, 661 S.W.2d 11 (Mo 1983) (en banc).  The doctrine of comparative 
fault allows a plaintiff to recover damages for injuries if he is less at fault than the defendant. Id. 
at 15-16. 
 127. Id. at 20-21. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 29 (Gunn, J., dissenting). 
 130. Keener v. Dayton Elec. Mfg. Co., 445 S.W.2d 362, 366 (Mo. 1969) (en banc). 
 131. Id. at 364. 
 132. Id. 
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persons, who are powerless to protect themselves, to bear such a steep 
financial burden.133 
From these and many other decisions it can readily be seen that there has 
been a recent tendency to extend liability in injury cases; to overrule 
long-established precedent; to reach conclusions more consistent with current 
society; and to develop principles which modernize the law. 
VII. THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM AND SOME GREAT MISSOURI JUDGES 
Throughout the history of Missouri, there has been a whole host of 
different types and kinds of courts.134  Originally, the Supreme Court consisted 
of only three, elected judges who sat in session around the State.135  Under the 
present judicial article, however, we have a unified, modern system of courts.  
In some areas, we have the Missouri non-partisan court plan which permits the 
Governor to select judges from a panel of names submitted by the Judicial 
Commission. 
One of the most fascinating cases involving the judges of the Supreme 
Court of Missouri is the case of Thomas v. Mead.136  The case was decided 
soon after the Civil War and it reflected the services that existed in that era.137  
In 1865, the people of Missouri voted for an “Ousting Ordinance” which 
ousted all judges and certain other political officers of the state and gave the 
Governor the power to appoint new ones.138  When the Supreme Court sat in 
St. Louis on June 12, 1865, two of the judges were William V.N. Bay and John 
D.S. Dryden.139  The Governor had appointed two new judges, David Wagner 
and William Lovelace, to replace Bay and Dryden.140  However, Bay and 
Dryden refused to leave the bench and recognize these new appointments.141  
Therefore, Governor Fletcher issued an order from the “Headquarters of the 
State of Missouri,” stating that the new judges, Wagner and Lovelace, “shall” 
be put on the Supreme Court.142  The order further stated that if, after receiving 
 
 133. Id. 
 134. There have been courts such as the following: municipal, police, justice of the peace, 
county, the St. Louis Court of Criminal Corrections, the Court of Common Pleas, the Court of 
Appeal and, of course, the Supreme Court. 
 135. Prior to 1851, the office was an elected one and, in most areas of the state has remained 
so.  Prior to 1875, there were three judges on the Supreme Court, but in 1890, the number was 
increased to seven. 
 136. 36 Mo. 232 (1865). 
 137. D.A. Divilbiss, The Ousting of Judges, 1 THE MISSOURI SUPREME COURT HISTORICAL 
JOURNAL 1 (1996). 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. See Thomas v. Mead, 36 Mo. 232, 253 (Mo. 1865); see also DIVILBISS, supra note 137, 
at 4. 
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the note, Bay and Dryden refused to vacate their seats on the Court, “you will 
direct policemen to arrest them,” and “as far as convenient avoid the use of 
violent means, but if in your judgment, you believe it necessary, do not hesitate 
to employ all the force it may require.”143  On June 14, General Coleman and 
the police bodily removed Judges Bay and Dryden and placed Judges Wagner 
and Lovelace on the bench.144 
Missouri has been very fortunate in having many great and good judges 
serving on the bench at all levels of courts.145  One of the greatest and most 
famous judges was Judge Thomas A. Sherwood of Springfield, Missouri, who 
was first elected in 1872.  But perhaps the most prolific, entertaining, and 
scholarly writer to ever serve on the Supreme Court was Judge Henry Lamm of 
Sedalia, who was elected in 1904 and stayed on the bench until 1914.  Judge 
Lamm was of Pennsylvania German parentage, and his ancestors immigrated 
to Pennsylvania before the Revolutionary War. He was born in a little village 
in Wayne County, Ohio on December 3, 1846.  He was educated in Ohio and 
graduated from the “Academic Department” of Michigan University in 1869.  
In that year he came to Sedalia, Missouri where he taught school, read law and 
was admitted to the bar in 1871.  For thirty years he was in general practice as 
the junior member of the firm of Sangree and Lamm in Sedalia.  He was 
prosecuting attorney of Pettis County and steadily refused nomination for other 
political office.  In 1902, he was nominated by the Republican party for the 
office of judge of the Supreme Court but was defeated.  In 1904, he was again 
nominated and won. 
During his term, he wrote (reportedly) 500 opinions, spiced with a style of 
language unequalled before or since.  It has been said that Judge Lamm 
instituted an innovation in writing.  While he followed the staid and established 
order of construction so manifest in legal opinions, he invigorated the 
bone-dry, orthodox, legal, literary production by an odd and decidedly blunt 
way of saying things, that is rather startling to the sticklers for the parched and 
barren specimens of writings with which the tons of buckram abound.  In many 
instances his pointed passages were directed to the legal profession, and he 
often injected humor in his writings.  He felt, even in his day, that there was 
too much resort to the courts and that much litigation could be avoided.  He 
said, “a lean compromise is better than a fat lawsuit.”146 
As to the function of law, courts, judges and justice, Judge Lamm had a 
few words of wisdom: 
 
 143. Thomas, 36 Mo. at 253; see also DIVILBLISS, supra note 137, at 4. 
 144. DIVILBLISS, supra note 54, at 4. 
 145. The first judges of the first court were Mathias McGirk, John D. Cook, and John R. 
Jones, appointed by Governor Alexander McNair. 
 146. Whitecotton v. St. L & H. Ry. Co., 157 S.W. 776, 777 (Mo. 1913). 
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As if it was our judicial duty to turn a flexible and receptive ear to catch an 
assumed groundswell of popular or partisan clamor, or become a weather vane 
to point the way the wind sits; as if we [courts] sit to administer revenge and 
not justice.147 
‘A judge should have two salts - the salt of wisdom, lest he be insipid; and the 
salt of conscience, lest he be devilish.’148 
As the furnace proveth the potter’s vessels, so the trial of a judge is his 
reasoning.149 
Justice is not to be entangled and strangled in and by the refinements of 
bookkeeping.150 
Judge Lamm’s sayings often resemble Poor Richard’s Almanac. Here are 
some: 
The mule don’t kick according to no rule.151 
Sin and debts are always more than we think them to be.152 
Fond of lawsuits, little wealth; fond of doctors, little health.153 
Some of his opinions also show the depth of his knowledge and the 
strength of his character.154  Judge Lamm represents the grand style of writing 
decisions. 
 
 147. Cook v. Globe Printing Co., 127 S.W. 332, 371 (Mo. 1910) (en banc). 
 148. Lackawanna Coal & Iron Co. v. Long, 133 S.W. 35, 38 (Mo. 1910) (quoting 3 Coke’s 
Inst: 147). 
 149. Armor v. Lewis, 161 S.W. 251, 253 (Mo. 1913). 
 150. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Continental Nat’l. Bank, 111 S.W. 574, 577 (Mo. 1908). 
 151. Lyman v. Dale, 171 S.W. 352, 355 (Mo. 1914). 
 152. Keeney v. McVoy, 103 S.W. 946, 948 (Mo. 1907). 
 153. Whitecotton v. St. Louis & H. Ry. Co., 157 S.W.2d 776, 777 (Mo. 1913). 
 154. See generally Lyman, 171 S.W. at 352.  The defendant’s mule kicked a buggy belonging 
to the plaintiff, which resulted in $5 in damages.  The question was whether the defendant was 
negligent in leading the mule on a city street.  The court held that there was no negligence.  Judge 
Lamm wrote the concurring opinion: 
As I see it, the case is this: Dale, a man of substance, a farmer, owned a brown and a gray 
mule, both young and of fine growth; one saddlewise, the other otherwise.  Both, used to 
the plow and wagon, were entitled to the designation ‘well broke and gentle.’  One Parker 
was Dale’s manservant, and in the usual course of his employment had charge of these 
mules.  On a day certain he had driven them to a water wagon in the humble office of 
supplying water to a clover huller in the Ozark region hard by its metropolis, to wit, 
Springfield.  Eventide had fallen; i.e., the poetical time of day had come when the beetle 
wheels his droning flight, drowsy tinkling lulls the distant folds, and all the air a solemn 
stillness holds.  In other words, dipping into the vernacular, it was time to ‘take out.’. . . . 
As the [witnesses] saw it, Parker was leading to the mule.  As will be seen a bit further on, 
at this point a grave question arises, to wit: Is it negligence to lead a mule by hand, or 
should he be fastened ‘neck and neck’ to his fellow? . . . 
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Another great judge was Justin Ruark.  He served for many years during 
the Fifties and Sixties as a judge of the Southern District of the Court of 
Appeals.  Judge Ruark was from Neosho, Missouri, and was admitted to the 
bar in 1923.  While he was on the Court of Appeals, Judge Ruark wrote 
hundreds of opinions in a painstaking and careful manner.  Like Judge Lamm, 
Judge Ruark had a real sense of humor.  Among the hundreds of his opinions is 
a divorce case in which the husband sought a divorce on the grounds of general 
indignities.155  The wife often referred to her husband, Lowell, and his relatives 
as “hillbillies,”156 which was alleged as an indignity.157  The trial court granted 
the divorce,158 but the Court of Appeals reversed.159  For other interesting 
 
There being no evidence tending to show the mule was ‘wild and unruly’ as charged, is 
such a mule per se a nuisance, a vicious animal, has he a heart devoid of social duty and 
fatally bend on mischief when led by a halter on the street of a town, and must his owner 
answer for his acts on that theory?. . . 
There are sporadic instances of mules behaving badly. . . .  In Spanish folk lore it is said: 
He who wants a mule without fault must walk.  So, at the French chimney corner the 
adage runs: The mule long keeps a kick in reserve for his master.  ‘The mule don’t kick 
according to no rule,’ saith the American Negro.  His voice has been a matter of derision, 
and there be those who put their tongue in their cheek when speaking of it.  Witness the 
German proverb: Mules make a great fuss about their ancestors having been asses.  And 
so on, and so on. . . 
Furthermore, the very word ‘jackass’ is a term of reproach everywhere, as in the literature 
of the law.  Do we not all know that a certain phase of the law of negligence, the 
humanitarian rule, first announced, it has been said, in a donkey case. . .has been called by 
those who deride it, the ‘jackass doctrine?’. . . Did not Sampson use the jawbone of one 
effectually on a thousand Phillistines? . . . Enough has been said to show that the ass is not 
without some rights in the courts even on sentimental grounds; ergo if his hybrid son, 
tracing his lineage as he does to the Jack of Kentucky and Andalusia, inherits some of his 
traits, he cannot be held bad per se.  Q.E.D. 
It is meet that a $5 case, having its tap root in anger (and possibly in liquor), should not 
drag its slow lengths through the courts for more than five years, even if it has earned the 
soubriquet of ‘the celebrated mule case.’ 
 155. Moore v. Moore, 337 S.W.2d 781 (Mo. App. 1960). 
 156. Id. at 786. 
 157. Id. at 782. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. at 789. Judge Ruark wrote: 
In respect to the plaintiff’s evidence that Minnie (wife) once referred to relatives of the 
plaintiff as hillbillies: We suggest that to refer to a person as a ‘hillbilly,’ or any other 
name, for that matter, might or might not be an insult, depending upon the meaning 
intended to be conveyed, the manner of utterance, and the place where the words are 
spoken. Webster’s New International Dictionary says that a hillbilly is ‘a backwoodsman 
or a mountaineer of the southern United States;—often used contemptuously.’  But 
without the added implication or inflection which indicates an intention to belittle, we 
would say that, here in Southern Missouri, the term is often given and accepted as a 
complimentary expression.  An Ozark hillbilly is an individual who has learned the real 
luxury of doing without the entangling complications of things which the dependent and 
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decisions written by Judge Ruark, see State ex rel. Sageser v. Ledbetter,160 
high school student entitled to diploma by writ of mandamus Daniel v. 
Childress,161 and Mills v. Yount.162 
One other great judge was Aytchmonde P. Stone, Jr. of the Springfield 
Court of Appeals.  The son of a Baptist minister, he was born in Oklahoma and 
received his law degree from Washington University.  Before he was 
appointed by Governor Donnelly, Judge Stone practiced in Springfield.  His 
541 opinions covered almost every field of law. Specifically, in MLB v. 
WRB,163 the Court decided whether a father, who was confined in the 
penitentiary, was entitled to visitation rights to his two sons.  The trial court 
denied the father such visitation rights,164 but Judge Stone reversed.165  Judge 
Stone, in the course of the opinion said: 
The effect of the father’s sentence to imprisonment for a term less than life was 
to suspend all of his civil rights during such term. But civil rights are to be 
distinguished from natural rights, which ‘are such as appertain originally and 
essentially to man - such as are inherent in his nature, and which he enjoys as a 
man, independent of any particular act on his side.’166. . . 
Although there was no such contention in the trial court, the mother here 
asserts that ‘(the father) has rendered himself unfit by virtue of his being 
convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for a crime involving moral 
turpitude.’  This prompts the observation that ‘(n)otwithstanding defendant’s 
present incarceration, as the result of a criminal conviction, the law does not 
preclude repentance, reformation, and forgiveness.’  The cause is remanded.167 
 
over-pressured city dweller is required to consider as necessities.  The hillbilly foregoes 
the hard grandeur of high buildings and canyon streets in exchange for wooded hills and 
verdant valleys.  In place of creeping traffic he accepts the rippling flow of the wandering 
stream. He does not hear the snarl of exhaust, the raucous braying of horns, and the sharp, 
strident babble of many tense voices.  For him instead is the measured beat of the katydid, 
the lonesome, far-off complaining of the whippoorwill, perhaps even the sound of a 
falling acorn in the infinite peace of the quiet woods. The hillbilly is often not familiar 
with new models, soirees, and office politics. But he does have the time and surroundings 
conducive to sober reflection and honest thought, the opportunity to get closer to his God. 
No, in Southern Missouri the appellation ‘hillbilly’ is not generally an insult or an 
indignity; it is an expression of envy. 
Id. at 788-89. 
 160. 559 S.W.2d 230 (Mo. App. 1977). 
 161. 381 S.W.2d 539 (Mo. App. 1964) (discussing dehorning an animal). 
 162. 393 S.W.2d 96 (Mo. App. 1965) (discussing trouble in Plainview Church). 
 163. 457 S.W.2d 465 (Mo. App. 1970). 
 164. Id. at 465. 
 165. Id. at 467. 
 166. Id. at 466. 
 167. Id. at 467.  For other interesting opinions of Judge Stone, see Reeves v. Reeves, 399 
S.W.2d 641 (Mo. App. 1966) (discussing the meaning of “truth”); Gaddy v. State Bd. of 
Registration for Healing Acts, 397 S.W.2d 347 (Mo. App. 1965) (discussing the meaning of drug 
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In a later, famous case of State ex rel. Kroger Co. v. Craig, a dog bite case, 
Judge Stone took the occasion to write about the great qualities of “man’s best 
friend - the dog.”168  Judge Stone referred to Senator Vest, who in representing 
a defendant in a dog bite case, stated in his argument before the jury:169 
The one absolutely unselfish friend that a man can have in this selfish world, 
the one that never deserts him, the one that never proves ungrateful or 
 
“addiction”); Chapman v. King, 396 S.W.2d 29 (Mo. App. 1965) (discussing newly discovered 
evidence); and Stanziale v. Musick, 370 S.W.2d 261 (Mo. 1963) (discussing the ultimate purpose 
of jury trials). 
 168. 329 S.W.2d 804 (Mo. App. 1959).  Judge Stone wrote: 
We observe preliminarily that, although plaintiff Joan’s petition depreciatingly and 
disparagingly refers to the animal alleged to have bitten her as ‘a tan mongrel dog,’ the 
canine (as a class) has a proud heritage rooted in antiquity.  To the ancients, the dog was 
more than a pet in the household, a servant in the field, and an assistant in the hunt.  He 
was an object of ceremony, reverence and veneration as well.  The Egyptians regarded 
him as a symbolic guide and protector of the dead, crowned their god Anubis with a 
doglike head, fashioned images of the dog on the walls of their burial chambers and 
temples, ceremoniously embalmed his body and entombed it in the special burial ground 
set aside for dogs in every town, and even built a city, Cynopolis, in his honor.  The dog 
was scarcely less important to the Greeks, where Socrates’ favorite pledge was by the 
dog, Plato called the dog a philosopher, Pythagoras taught that a dog should be held to the 
mouth of a dying man as the animal most worthy of receiving the departing spirit and 
perpetuating its virtues, and in Greek mythology the dog of the hunter Orion was 
transformed into Sirius, the brightest star in the heavens, whose rise marked the Athenian 
New Year.  Ethiopian tribesmen once crowned a dog as their king; and, with the ancient 
Persians, it was a less grievous offense to kill a man than to destroy a dog.  In Rome, dogs 
became so popular that Julius Caesar is said to have mused aloud that Roman ladies of 
luxury had decided to have dogs instead of children; and, Circero said, in tribute to dogs, 
that ‘such fidelity of dogs in protecting what is committed to their charge, such 
affectionate attachment to their masters, such jealousy of strangers, such incredible 
acuteness of nose in following a track, such keenness in hunting—what else do they 
evince but that these animals were created for the use of man.’  Centuries later, Olway the 
poet wrote of dogs as ‘honest creatures (who) ne’er betray their masters, never fawn on 
any they love not.’  And, in his classic encomium to the dog triumphantly climaxing the 
celebrated suit for the loss of ‘Old Drum,’ Missouri’s Senator George Graham Vest 
eulogized the fierce loyalty, unswerving devotion and unwavering steadfastness of the 
dog—noble qualities perhaps the more highly esteemed by man because he is so often 
found wanting in them himself. 
  Since, down through the ages, the dog has earned and has merited acceptance as 
man’s best friend, small wonder then that the law long ago recognized dogs as ordinarily 
harmless and classified them as animals domitae naturae, i.e., domestic animals, rather 
than as animals ferae naturae, i.e., wild animals, and that, in an action against the owner or 
harborer of a dog for injury inflicted by such animal, defendant’s scienter (i.e., actual or 
constructive knowledge) of the vicious or dangerous propensities of the dog became and 
still is (except where removed by statute) an essential element of the cause of action and a 
necessary prerequisite to recovery. 
Id. at 808-09; see also The True Story of Old Drum, 19 MO. HIST. REV. 313 (1925). 
 169. Burden v. Hornsby, 50 Mo. 238 (1872). 
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treacherous, is his dog.  Gentlemen of the jury, a man’s dog stands by him in 
prosperity and in poverty, in health and in sickness.  He will sleep on the cold 
ground, where the wintry winds blow and the snow drives fierce, if only he 
may be near his master’s side.  He will kiss the hand that has no food to offer; 
he will lick the wounds and sores that come in encounter with the roughness of 
the world.  He guards the sleep of his pauper master as if he were a prince.  
When all other friends desert he remains.  When all riches take wings and 
reputation falls to pieces, he is as constant in his love as the sun in its journey 
through the heavens.  If fortune drives the master forth an outcast in the world, 
friendless and homeless, the faithful dog asks no higher privilege than that of 
accompanying to guard against danger, to fight against his enemies, and when 
the last scene of all comes, and death takes the master in his embrace and his 
body is laid away in the cold ground, no matter if all other friends pursue their 
way, there by his graveside will the noble dog be found, his head between his 
paws, his eyes sad but open in alert watchfulness, faithful and true even in 
death. 
VIII.  THE FUTURE AND CONCLUSION 
What the future holds is anyone’s guess. But, after reading a number of the 
decisions, since 1990, and after examining legislation relating to the law, I 
believe there is now a hint of a trend toward restrictions, less-generous, and 
more conservatism in the law.  For example, the Missouri General Assembly 
passed the “Tort Reform Act” which places limitations on punitive damages, 
and reinstates the power of the judge to decrease the amount of damages a 
plaintiff may recover.  We have seen the Congress struggle with 
product-liability reform in an attempt to establish uniform guidelines in this 
field.  Recently, we have witnessed Congress struggle with a crime bill, which 
imposes the death penalty for a whole host of offenses. 
In short, the tendency of the future appears to be of restriction, which is 
consistent with the cyclical nature of the law.  Such cycles in the law have ever 
been present.  The law shifts from harshness and strictness, to moderation and 
liberality, which reflects the law’s natural growth and progression. 
Since Missouri was admitted to the Union, the laws and judicial decisions 
have changed dramatically, mirroring the changes in our society.  Having 
altered our strict moral values to adjust to more liberal principles, we have 
transformed from an agricultural and industrial society to a highly-
technological, global community.  It is a vastly different world today than in 
1821 - and whether these changes are for better or for worse is for the reader to 
decide. 
 
